The EU, the US, and Trade Policy: Competitive Interdependence in the Management of Globalization by Sbragia , Alberta
  1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The EU, the US, and Trade Policy: Competitive Interdependence In the 
Management of Globalization 
 
Alberta Sbragia 
University of Pittsburgh 
sbragia@pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
European Union Studies Association 11
th Biennial Conference, Marina Del Rey, 
California, April 23-25, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   2
The EU, the US, and Trade Policy: Competitive Interdependence In the 
Management of Globalization 
 
 
Alberta Sbragia 
 
Competitive interdependence  marked  the European Union (EU) - United 
States (US) relationship  as the GATT/ World Trade Organization (WTO) 
was strengthened and as each enlarged its territorial sphere of influence. The 
EU initially expanded its influence outside  Europe by granting 
nonreciprocal preferences to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) 
states while the US subsequently used the WTO to force the EU-ACP 
relationship into WTO-compliance. Adopting regional and bilateral 
strategies, the US negotiated NAFTA and Latin American and Asian free 
trade agreements. The US thereby  expanded its sphere of influence. The EU  
responded  by  negotiating equivalent free trade agreements in both Latin 
America and Asia. As it expands its territorial sphere of influence, the EU 
may now be managing globalization by outstripping the US.  The US-EU 
relationship thus is marked by both competition and interdependence. 
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In 2006, the Commission issued “Global Europe: Competing in the World.” 
(COM 2006) That document symbolized a new era in the trade policy of the 
European Union (EU) and its response to globalization.
i It recognized that 
the world economy had changed and that the EU’s trade policy had to be 
up—dated to take account of important emerging markets and the activity of 
trade competitors, especially the United States (US).  The Communication 
acknowledged that, while the EU’s commercial diplomacy had played a 
major role in the global economic arena, it was time t change the direction of 
such diplomacy. The Communication thus symbolized a major strategic 
change in the EU’s trade policy. 
 
The Commission’s document represented  a re-thinking of how the EU 
should go about “managing globalization.” (Meunier 2007) In fact, the 
question of whether the EU manages globalization-- and if so how- has 
attracted  scholars concerned with the EU’s international role. Jacoby and 
Meunier (2008), drawing on Pascal Lamy (2004) have argued that the EU 
“manages” globalization by utilizing various mechanisms.    3
 
Two such mechanisms are particularly relevant to the EU’s trade policy as 
used to manage globalization. First, the empowerment of international 
institutions in the field of commercial diplomacy has played a crucial role in 
such management. The multilateral system is far more powerful in the area 
of trade than in any other policy area. Centered on the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and trade rounds such as the ongoing Doha Round, the  
multilateral system of rules surrounds and impinges on the EU’s commercial 
diplomacy. Multilateral institutions impose rules which apply to all states 
and thereby create order. They help to tame the “anarchy” of the 
international system. The WTO is a particularly key multilateral institution 
because it has a powerful dispute settlement regime and thus can impose a 
degree of economic order. (Zangl 2008) However, its predecessor, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was also an important 
multilateral institution. It was strengthened when the EU was established 
because it was the only institution which brought the EU and the US 
together to negotiate over trade.  It became a key institutional fulcrum for 
US-EU trade relations.  
 
The second mechanism outlined by Jacoby and Meunier involves the EU in 
expanding its influence in areas other than in its own member-states. This 
second mechanism permits the EU to shape globalization in its own interests 
outside its own frontiers.  The EU can use it to try to shield EU citizens from 
the  harm which could be caused by the operation of the market outside the 
EU’s own formal boundaries. In the area of trade policy, it allows the EU to 
“export” its “way of doing business” so as to make target  countries more 
accommodating to EU interests in the field of trade.  
 
This article argues that those two mechanisms—the empowerment of the 
multilateral trade institutions (the GATT and the WTO)  and the 
enlargement of the area influenced by the EU---  need to be situated within a 
transatlantic framework when addressing the EU’s trade policy.  The EU is 
operating within a global arena within which the US is its major competitor, 
and the structural nature of that competition is crucial for understanding the 
options open to the EU. While the EU has supported and used the 
GATT/WTO, so has the US. In a similar vein, both have extended the 
territorial sphere of their  influence, often explicitly in reaction to one 
another.  
   4
Such a  pattern follows a rough but recognizable sequence. In phase one , the 
EU challenged the US in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT) while spreading its territorial influence through enlargement and 
constructing a special relationship with its former colonies.  In phase two, 
the US used the WTO to  force the EU to re-shape its territorial relations 
with those same states while simultaneously extending its territorial 
influence. In phase 3, the EU has begun to once again  extend its influence..  
 
The EU and US are therefore bound together. The competitive 
interdependence which binds them includes a dual logic. Each attempts to 
use the WTO to control the other while simultaneously attempting to expand 
its influence through the use of trade agreements which are WTO-compliant. 
Since each is a key player in  international trade, the opportunity structure 
open to either is shaped by the structure which has been created by the other. 
This type of competitive interdependence is historically rooted as it is a 
structural condition arising from the enormous economic power which each 
exerts in the global economy.  
 
 
  
The European Union and the Management of Globalization 
 
 Although the term “managed globalization” refers to the last fifteen years or 
so, in the area of trade policy the EU became a force in writing the rules of 
globalization as soon as the Treaty of Rome came into force.  It was 
empowered to operate as a unitary actor within the GATT with the European 
Commission (at least formally) acting as the sole negotiator, The initial 
commitment by the Six to a unitary trade policy was partially due to their 
wish to be more effective within the GATT than each had been when 
operating individually. The European Commission, for its part, supported 
the participation of the Six in the Kennedy Round because it wished to 
strengthen its position as the EU’s negotiator in the face of  reluctance on the 
part of the member-states to allow the Commission to play that role. 
(Coppolaro 2006; Johnson 1998; Winham 1986:318)  
 
The EU (along with the US) has played a key role in delaying,  launching, 
and closing multilateral trade rounds.  It  did not  initially  support the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations—strongly backed by the US—and had 
to be convinced to support it before the Round could be initiated..  ( 
Woolcock and Hodges 1996: 305-6; Paemen and Bensch  1995:32-36; Davis   5
2003,274; Meunier 2000).  By contrast, the EU strongly supported—in 
contrast to a reluctant US-- the launch of the failed Millenium Round 
(Commission 1999; European Council 1999 , 13) and the subsequent Doha 
Round of negotiations (Kerremans 2005). The EU and the US are 
interdependent in that both must support the launch of a trade round before it 
can materialize.  
 
The EU and the US, when collaborating, were able to wield enormous power 
during the Uruguay Round. The two ‘agreed in October 1990 to use their 
market power to close the Uruguay Round on terms they favored’. They 
both  ‘withdrew from the GATT 1947 obligations (including its MFN 
guarantee) to countries that did not accept the Final Act and join the WTO’. 
(Barton, Goldstein, Josling, and Steinberg 2006: 65-66). Not surprisingly, 
most states decided to join the WTO to ensure that the two largest markets in 
the world would not exclude them from the benefits of the Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) guarantee. 
 
In the post-Uruguay period, the EU strongly supported multilateral 
negotiations and the  WTO as an institution.  Multilateralism in fact  can be 
viewed as intrinsic to the EU’s  current view of how global economic 
governance should be structured. Analysts generally agree that EU trade 
officials have devoted most of their attention to the WTO since its 
establishment.  (Evenett 2007a: 20) Such attention to the WTO has also been 
encouraged by the fact that, in Pascal Lamy’s words, “the WTO has too 
often been the sole focus for efforts to strengthen international governance” 
due to a lack of “suitable multilateral reference point[s]”in other issue areas.( 
European Commission 2004:5) Such support is reinforced by its traditional 
(now fraying) hesitation to engage in bilateral trade negotiations with OECD 
members, viewing such negotiations as a major challenge to the prominence 
of multilateral negotiations and multilateral rules.  
 
Not surprisingly, then,  the EU  strongly backed the launch of the failed 
Millenium Round (Commission 1999) and the Doha Round. In fact, 
Kerremans (2004:371) argues that ‘the idea of a new round of multilateral 
trade negotiations—the first one in the World Trade Organization—is 
largely a European one.’ The European Commission viewed a new Round as 
a way to deal with the further liberalization of agriculture by embedding 
such negotiations within a more expansive negotiating framework, thereby 
facilitating ‘package deals.’ (Kerremans 2004: 372)  
   6
 
Expanded Territorial Influence: The EU has also been very successful at 
extending the territorial range of its influence. Most notably, the Six 
gradually enlarged to the EU-27. The EU’s influence was particularly strong 
during the accession process of the post-communist states in Eastern Europe. 
(Kelley 2004; Jacoby 2006; Vachudova 2005) Such enlargement , while 
burdening the EU in some respects,  allowed it to exercise greater market 
power (Young and Peterson 2006).  It also permitted Brussels to “export” its 
regulatory framework  to its geographic neighbors while simultaneously 
strengthening its regulatory impact on the global stage. Its expanded market 
combined with its extensive internal 27-state regulatory structure  increased 
the EU’s geo-economic and geo-regulatory power. (Damro 2006)  Finally, 
the  EU-Turkey customs union (which excludes agriculture) came into force 
in 1996 and again added to the EU’s territorial reach..  
 
The EU, however, has also expanded its territorial influence outside the 
European continent. Geographic contiguity has not been necessary for the 
EU to exercise influence over other states’ economic space. Such influence 
shapes the opportunities and constraints faced by EU exporters as well as by 
third party exporters desiring to penetrate the EU market. It also shapes the 
opportunities for EU multinationals desiring to invest abroad. Exercising 
such  influence has not been limited to economic spaces, however. The EU 
has tried, through conditionality, to affect policy areas such as human rights 
and gender equality.  (Lister and Carbone 2006) 
 
The instruments used by the EU have included development aid (Holland 
2008), association agreements, free trade agreements, and inter-regional 
dialogue, including political dialogue. One of the earliest attempts by the EU 
to exercise influence outside its own boundaries involved developing 
countries with a colonial history linked to Britain and France—the African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries which were recognized as a “region” 
by the EU but by no one else.  The  various Lome Conventions  allowed the 
EU to maintain  close contact with ACP states and to institutionalize its 
relations. (Carbone 2007).  
 
For example, the EU-ACP relationship includes an ACP-EU Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly which meets twice a year, with 78 Members of the 
European Parliament meeting with 78 parliamentarians from the ACP states.  
For decades, the ACP grouping has  represented a key link for the EU with 
the developing world. (Holland 2002) .However, over time EU interest in   7
the ACP relationship waned as new members without historical ties to ACP 
members joined the Union, the postcommunist states’ began the accession 
process, and the Mediterranean began to be viewed as  important for the 
security of the EU. (Ravenhill 2004: 126; Crawford 2004) 
 
In the mid-90s, the EU began to negotiate with non-ACP states. In 1995, the 
EU signed the EU-Mercosur Framework Agreement as well as the EU-Israel 
Association Agreement. The following year,   a Framework Cooperation 
Agreement with Chile was signed.  The Economic Partnership, Political 
Coordination, and Co-operation Agreement between the European Union 
and Mexico was signed in 1997, and a Free Trade Agreement  went into 
effect in 2000  (Dur 2007; Szymanski and Smith 2005, Sanabuja 2000)). In 
1999, the EU successfully concluded a Trade, Development and Co-
operation Agreement with South Africa. (Frennhoff-Larsen 2007).  As we 
shall argue below,  these agreements were largely negotiated in response to 
the establishment of  NAFTA and the Clinton Administration’s proposed 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). They were intended to extend the 
EU’s influence as a counterpoint to the US strategy of re-shaping economic 
geography. 
 
Beginning in 1997, however, the EU stopped pursuing new free trade 
agreements. Once the World Trade Organization (WTO) had been created in 
1995, some EU members viewed bilateral free trade agreements as a threat 
to the institutionalized multilateral system that the Uruguay Round had 
brought into being. Pascal Lamy, Trade Commissioner from 1999-2004, was 
so  personally committed to multilateralism that he did not pursue new free 
trade agreements--although those already in progress were allowed to be 
concluded. (Evenett 2007a; Defraigne 2002; Meunier 2007: Lamy 2002).  
 
 
 
THE UNITED STATES RESPONDS 
 
The commercial diplomacy of the United States has traditionally viewed the 
EU as its major interlocutor. The American response to the EU’s policies 
and power has included actions at both the multilateral and regional levels. 
The GATT and subsequently the WTO have provided the US with a forum 
within which to challenge the EU, though often with mixed results. The US, 
however, found that  WTO-compliant regional and bilateral responses were 
quite effective in extending the sphere of American influence.   8
 
The US Challenges the EU: Multilateral Responses 
 
By establishing the EU, the Six changed the structure of the global trading 
system of that era by adopting a common external tariff and by developing a 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The United States was forced to 
respond.  In the area of trade policy, therefore, the multilateral institution of 
GATT  trade rounds and later the WTO  have been crucial for both the US 
and the EU. Arguably, the importance of the GATT Rounds was that they 
represented a key mechanism by which the US and the EU could try to 
“manage” each other.  
 
 Thus, the  1960-61 GATT conference (Dillon Round) was primarily 
concerned with addressing the consequences  for exporters to the markets of 
the Six, with special concern being expressed by agricultural exporters. 
(Swinbank and Tanner 1996) The United States was so concerned about the 
future shape of the Common Agricultural Policy  (CAP) that during the 
Round the Kennedy Administration ‘requested a ‘‘semi-seat’’ at the 
Community table’ so that the US would be consulted as the CAP was being 
planned. (Devuyst 2008:97)   
 
In 1962, President Kennedy in calling for what came to be known as the 
Kennedy Round identified the expansion of the European Common Market 
as one of the five new challenges which had made “obsolete [America’s] 
traditional trade policy.” (Metzger 1964). The US, in fact, changed its 
negotiating strategy so as to more effectively negotiate with Brussels. 
Previously, US trade negotiators had negotiated item by item, but during the 
Kennedy Round they  received Congressional permission  to negotiate by 
broad categories of goods, reflecting the EU’s own internal arrangements. 
((Bauer, De Sola Pool, and Dexter 1972:74; Evans 1971)   
 
  Kennedy hoped that trade liberalization would expand American exports to 
Europe’s growing economies. It quickly became clear, however, that 
agriculture would, as feared, present a major stumbling block, and that ‘the 
United States might eventually have to settle for a bad deal in agriculture to 
get the type of industrial agreement that would be in the American interest.’ 
( Schwartz 2003: 37) President Johnson  decided to continue with the Round 
with agriculture off the table, but agriculture was to continue to be a very 
difficult area to negotiate during succeeding GATT rounds.    
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While extremely disappointed by the EU’s CAP, the US continued to 
support European integration. It supported the Commission’s role as the sole 
negotiator during the “empty chair crisis” in spite of the GATT Director 
General’s proposal that the six negotiate as individual states. The US  
supported the position that ‘the Kennedy Round had to be negotiated by the 
Community, represented by the Commission.” (Coppolaro 2006:229). Given 
the reluctance of the member states to allow the Commission  to act as sole 
negotiator, American support for the Commission’s role was significant.  
 
 From the Kennedy Round forward, the US and the EU faced each other at 
the multilateral level. It was there that they negotiated as equals and it was 
there that they came into conflict. The Tokyo Round (1973-1979) announced 
the  arrival  of an international economic system ‘principally managed by a 
US/EC partnership.’ (Winham 1986: 11) Launching the Uruguay Round was 
initially supported by the US while opposed by the EU. (Davis 2003: 272-
274; Meunier 2000: 122). After the Round was launched, the US made clear 
that it would choose to kill the Round rather than accept the kind of 
agricultural reforms it had accepted in the Tokyo Round. (Davis 2003: 286) 
Agriculture was indeed addressed  in the Uruguay Round, although  
agreement was not finalized until the Blair House Agreement was modified 
so as to render it acceptable to France. (Meunier 2000: 121-126)   
 
The Uruguay Round led to the establishment of the  WTO which in turn was 
used by the US  to challenge the EU’s long standing preferential trade 
relationships with the ACP countries. The US  thereby confronted one of the 
EU’s channels for extending its influence. The non-reciprocal preferences 
that  the EU granted the ACP states had already been controversial during 
the Tokyo Round, and the WTO provided a forum within which they could 
be successfully questioned. Imported bananas provided the  material for such 
a challenge, as they were imported into the EU both from  ACP countries 
and from Latin American producers. The preferences granted to ACP 
bananas as opposed to bananas from all developing countries were open to 
litigation. 
 
The EU-ACP relationship:The  EU’s single market program had led (after 
intense intra-EU conflict) to the unification of what  had previously been a 
disparate nationally-based approach to the market for bananas.  When a new 
EU-wide framework was put in place in 1993,  it violated WTO rules 
because it did not treat all developing countries’ imports equally as required. 
Bananas from ACP countries received privileged access to the EU market   10
vis a vis bananas from Latin American producers. (Alter and Meunier 2006; 
Grynberg 1998:6-7). Complaints to the GATT from the Latin American 
states were blocked by the EU, a permissible strategy under GATT rules. 
 
However, when the WTO was established as agreed to in the Uruguay 
Round agreement, the weak GATT dispute settlement procedure was 
replaced by a much more authoritative procedure. At that point, the US 
(defending the interests of the US company Chiquita Brands) joined the 
legal battle. After a complicated set of legal maneuvers, the US and the Latin 
American producers won, and the EU was forced to begin dismantling the 
banana regime  that privileged ACP producers. (Alter and Meunier 2006; 
O’Connor 2004).  The WTO which the EU had so strongly supported could 
clearly be used to constrain the EU itself. 
 
The decision was instrumental in leading the EU to acknowledge that the 
preferential relationships represented by the Lome Conventions would have 
to be  modified. The US had long viewed the non-reciprocal preferences 
which lay at the core of the EU-ACP relationship as violating the MFN 
principle so central to the GATT/WTO.  The Cotonou Agreement, which 
replaced the Lome Conventions, essentially accepted that development goals 
and trade liberalization a la WTO were compatible.  
 
Non-reciprocal preferences were no longer legitimate; preferential trade 
relations with selected developing countries were no longer acceptable. They 
were to be replaced by EU-ACP trade liberalization as well as development 
assistance funds (Michel 2008)   As a result, the Commission began the 
arduous task of developing the so-called Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) which were to be WTO-compliant  while integrating the ACP states 
into the world economy.  EPAs were to be finalized with six “regions” by 
December 31, 2007, the date when the waiver from MFN granted by the 
2001 Doha Ministerial Conference was to expire.  (Thallinger 2007: 501) 
 
The EU, by attempting to establish EPAs which involved “regions”, sought 
to be WTO compliant by using Article XXIV as its guide. (Curran, Nilsson 
and Brew 2008)  However, the storm of criticism which it has faced from 
both civil society groups as well as national parliamentarians has 
demonstrated how difficult it is to mix development with trade. (Mombrial  
2008) Although negotiations began in September 2002,  only 35 countries 
had initialed an EPA by the deadline of December 31, 2007.   By that date, 
only  one region—composed of the CARICOM states plus the Dominican   11
Republic—had initialed  a full  EPA, which it subsequently signed  in 
October 2008. The other countries initialed an “interim” agreement which 
included only trade in goods and excluded areas which are far more 
controversial, such as services  and investment.  It is unlikely that those will 
be finalized soon. At the end of 2008, for example, only two of the 14 states 
making up the “Pacific region” had signed provisional agreements. 
 
Though the move from the Lome Convention to a WTO-compliant EU-ACP 
relationship was strongly supported by  member-states which  had 
traditionally been hostile to the nonreciprocal preferences for the ACP states, 
WTO decisions  provided the trigger for the overhaul of the relationship. 
The US role in the process represented a continuation of its previously 
unsuccessful efforts in GATT Rounds to force the EU to transform the EU-
ACP relationship by making it GATT-compatible. Although the US and the 
EU had collectively given birth to the WTO, the US was not reluctant to use 
its power against the EU.   
 
  
 
The US challenges the EU Again:North American Regionalism  
 
One of the most effective challenges to the EU came in the form of 
American regionalism. Partially due to the Uruguay Round’s very difficult 
negotiations,  and partially in response to the EU’s “1992” single market 
program, the US negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).  The United States joined Canada and Mexico in the largest 
regional trading bloc outside of the EU itself.  The US had decided to extend 
its own sphere of influence by negotiating an expansive regional trade 
agreement encompassing trade in goods and services, investment, and 
intellectual property rights.  
 
NAFTA, which came into force in 1994,  was such a powerful economic 
instrument that it has been described as ‘among the postwar period’s most 
consequential and far-reaching   international developments’  within the 
field of global economic relations.(Gruber 2001:705). It  represented a major 
challenge to the European Union, for it marked the first time the US had 
definitively shown its acceptance of regionalism rather than maintaining its 
traditional loyalty to multilateralism. (Sbragia 2007) In the tug of war 
between regionalism and multilateralism (Sbragia 2008), NAFTA struck a 
strong blow for economic regionalism. The EU during that same period was   12
establishing its single market so that the world economy witnessed a 
simultaneous  deepening of  integration within the EU and an acceptance of 
regional economic integration in North America. Just as the post 1958 
period could be viewed as the post-EU period, so too the post- 1994 period 
could be seen as the post-NAFTA period 
 
NAFTA represented the emergence of the US as a “regional” power, one 
which was willing to use a far-reaching trade agreement to liberalize trade in 
North America. NAFTA bound the US Canada, and Mexico into a new form 
of economic regionalism, one which brought together members of both the 
developing and the industrialized world. Just as the EU’s birth as the post-
war world’s first major example of economic regionalism presented new 
challenges to the United States, so too did the introduction of American 
regionalism into the global economy confront its European counterpart with 
new dilemmas.  
 
In the pre-NAFTA period, the US had chosen only multilateralism to pursue 
liberalization while choosing a bilateral approach to pursue trade 
restrictions. In the post-NAFTA period, by contrast, the US negotiated a 
series of trade agreements with Latin and Central American states, Australia, 
Singapore, Jordan , and most recently South Korea. NAFTA, therefore, 
represented a key break in the US strategy of pursuing the liberalization of 
trade primarily through multilateral negotiations. 
 
Furthermore, the integration of the Canadian, American, and Mexican 
economies signaled the arrival of a regionalism which coupled both 
developed and developing economies into a “WTO plus” very expansive 
free trade area. The incorporation of the large Mexican market into the North 
American trade area, an incorporation which included intellectual property 
rights and investment protection, represented a milestone in the shaping of 
the international trading system. NAFTA, in brief, forced all trading states to 
eventually re-think their trade strategies. The EU was no exception.    
 
As the EU moved toward enlargement to the east, the US  indicated that it 
wished to  negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Such an 
agreement  would have represented a major challenge for the EU, for whom 
Latin America is a major export market. However, the Clinton 
Administration was unable to obtain negotiating authority, and the effort to 
extend the American sphere of influence had to wait for the  Bush   13
Administration. Thus, as the EU became more important globally,  the US 
reacted by seeking to expand its territorial influence in Latin America . 
 
 The Bush Doctrine: Competitive Liberalization    
 
The Bush Administration successfully negotiated a relatively large number 
of   free trade agreements after it (barely) was given “trade promotion” 
authority by Congress:  Chile (approved by Congress in 2003),  Central 
America and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA) (approved by Congress in 
2005), and Peru ( approved by the then- Democratically-controlled Congress 
in December 2007 after changing provisions related to labor, the 
environment, and access to medicines).Agreements were also finalized with 
Colombia in November 2006, Panama in December 2006 and South Korea 
in April 2007. The South Korean agreement, if  implemented, would be the 
most important trade agreement since NAFTA. It would represent the 
world’s third largest economic bloc and ‘would be the second largest FTA in 
which the United States is a participant and the largest in which South Korea 
is a participant.’ (Cooper and Manyin  2007:1)  All three agreements, 
however, have run into stiff opposition in the Democratically-controlled 
Congress,  and as of December 2008 had not  been approved. 
 
The negotiations in Latin America and Asia provided the substance for a 
trade policy strategy known as ‘competitive liberalization’, articulated by 
Robert Zoellick,, the United States Trade Representative in the Bush 
Administration’s first term.  Essentially, the US began negotiating very 
expansive (WTO plus)  bilateral free trade agreements  with those states 
eager to gain access to the US market. Such agreements would encourage 
‘the adoption abroad of US-style market-friendly business laws and 
regulations, or at least the adoption of regulations that US businesses can 
accommodate more easily.’ (Evenett and Meier 2008:31) The Bush 
Administration hoped such an approach would trigger a dynamic which 
would encourage other states to seek bilateral agreements with the US  as 
well as move toward a multilateral agreement in the Doha Round. (Evenett 
and Meier 2008)  
 
The strategy of ‘competitive liberalization’ represented a clear cut example 
of the Bush Administration’s interest in enlarging the sphere of US 
influence.  While the Clinton Administration had used somee elements of 
the strategy so as to raise  the likelihood of obtaining a multilateral 
agreement (Steinberg 1998: 4), the Bush Administration implemented the   14
strategy in such a way that bilateral trade agreements increased rapidly. 
Zoellick was driven by a sense that the US had been ‘falling behind the rest 
of the world in pursuing trade agreements.’ ( Zoellick, 2002), and the zeal 
with which the US pursued bilateral free trade (as well as competition and 
investment)  agreements  was directed at making up for lost time.   
 
 
The EU Reacts to the US Challenge 
 
NAFTA presented a serious regional challenge to the EU as it expanded 
American influence by using regionalism rather than multilateralism.  It 
triggered the re-shaping of the transatlantic relationship, one in which the 
EU- rather than dealing with the Americas exclusively at the multilateral 
level- began to develop bilateral relations with Mexico and Chile and “inter-
regional” relations with Mercosur and the six Central American states.   
 
The Americas would become a central focus for both the US and the EU; the 
two became rival suitors. The EU courted Mexico, Chile, and Mercosur 
while the  Clinton Administration pursued an “all-Americas” strategy by 
trying to obtain “fast track” authority from Congress so as to negotiate a 
hemispheric free trade area, eventually to be known as Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA).  
 
 The EU’s response to NAFTA was clear-cut. Pierre Defraigne, Deputy 
Director-General in the Commission’s Directorate-General for Trade stated 
the dynamic clearly: “In order not to be evicted from the NAFTA market, 
the EU immediately started a FTA negotiation with Mexico.” (Defraigne 
2002:7).In May 1995, the EU began negotiating the EU-Mexico Global 
Agreement, the first transatlantic free trade agreement negotiated by the EU.  
The European Commission’s website entry on the EU-Mexico Free Trade 
Agreement(http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/mexico/ftapr_
en.htm)  makes explicit comparisons with NAFTA, for the US is the EU’s 
major competitor in both trade and investment  in Mexico. In November 
1999,  the EU began negotiating a FTA with Mercosur Ia regional customs 
union in the making created by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay). 
In 2000, negotiations began with Chile, which had been expected to join 
NAFTA but was kept from doing so by President Clinton’s lack of 
negotiating authority. 
   15
 In fact, due to the lack of presidential negotiating authority, the US was 
unable to initiate  FTAA negotiations,  as well as those with Chile. .This 
respite allowed the EU to “catch up” by finalizing the  agreement with 
Mexico, negotiating a FTA with Chile, and initiating negotiations with 
Mercosur in November 1999. However, the did not use the time to move 
aggressively in the rest of Latin America. The process of enlargement was 
clearly taking priority, and the EU was therefore not playing a leadership 
role in Latin America’s commercial diplomacy.   
 
However, the election of George W. Bush as President, coupled with the 
Republican control of the House and Senate,  ended the EU’s respite and 
initiated a period in which the US moved very quickly to begin negotiations 
for the FTAA as well as with Chile and Central America.  
 
The EU and the US have both failed to successfully negotiate with Brazil 
and  Mercosur, both of which offer the most important markets in Latin 
America. In fact, the US began negotiating with individual Latin American 
states because of Mercosur’s resistance to the US agenda during the FTAA 
negotiations. Mercosur refused to accept the US position that FTAA 
negotiations should only be conducted bilaterally-that is, Mercosur could not 
act as a unitary negotiator. Furthermore, the US and Mercosur (read Brazil) 
could not agree on agricultural liberalization, and many observers concluded 
that progress would only be made after the Doha Round’s successful 
conclusion. 
 
The EU for its part has been negotiating with Mercosur since November 
1999 with no end currently in sight. It has negotiated with Mercosur only as 
a regional grouping and resisted any attempts to move negotiations toward 
individual Mercosur members. However it too has been unable to accept 
Brazil’s demands for agricultural liberalization. Thus, both the EU and the 
US negotiations with Mercosur are stalled. The FTAA is considered dormant 
if not dead, and the EU is faced with the prospect of still more, perhaps 
fruitless, negotiations unless the Doha Round can come to an agreement on 
agricultural liberalization. 
 
The EU, therefore, has turned its attention to Central America and to the 
Andean Community. In 2006, the six Central American states (which have 
negotiated an agreement with the US) and the EU began negotiating an 
association and free trade agreement which they hoped to sign  by 2010.  
However, the EU-Andean Community negotiations, initiated in June 2007,   16
have not gone as smoothly as those of their Central American neighbors. In 
fact, in November 2008, the EU abandoned its insistence on a “region-to-
region” negotiation and decided to negotiate with Columbia and Peru, both 
which have already signed free trade agreements with the US (the agreement 
with Peru has been approved by Congress, while the US-Columbia 
agreement is viewed as very problematic).      
 
However, the EU has not confined its attention to the Americas. It has also 
turned  to Asia, where the EU’s negotiators have been absent until recently, 
while those from the US have been very visible. The competition between 
the US and the EU, in fact, has become quite intense in Asia. Whereas the 
US concluded a free trade agreement with S. Korea,  in 2007 the EU  began 
negotiating free  trade agreements with India, ASEAN (with the EU 
currently exploring some version of ‘variable geometry’ in the negotiations ) 
and South Korea.   
 
Given the difficulties the US-S. Korea trade agreement faced in Washington 
in 2008, coupled with  the lack of ongoing US-India and US-ASEAN free 
trade negotiations, it may well be that the EU is going to outpace the US in 
trade liberalization in Asia. The implications of an EU-India FTA are 
particularly significant for the US, especially since agriculture will not be on 
the negotiating table. The concern with which American multinationals are 
following the EU-India negotiations was well expressed by Wal-Mart’s 
director of international corporate affairs. In her words, ‘if Carrefour gets 
better access to the Indian market than Wal-Mart, there will be hell to pay’. 
(Stokes 2008:26)  Whereas the EU has been a ‘follower’ in extending its 
influence to Latin America, it may emerge as a ‘leader’ in Asia.  
 
In the trade arena, the process of enlarging the EU’s territorial sphere of 
influence  in competition with the US  is not static. The EU may appear to be 
a “follower” at one point in time but may transform itself into  a “leader” in 
a subsequent period.  Competitive interdependence incorporates an inbuilt 
dynamic in which the US and the EU necessarily compete, whether at the 
multilateral or regional level or both. They cannot ignore each other for long 
periods of time—the cost to them will be too high.  That same dynamic 
furthers globalization as well as the attempt to manage—and to profit from-- 
that same globalization.  
 
Given the structure of  the multilateral  system in trade, the advantages 
which can be gained from negotiating regional free trade agreements, and   17
the competitive interdependence which exists between the EU and the US,  
the process of globalization will involve a dual logic. The management of 
globalization almost necessarily will further it.    Conceptualizing the EU 
and the US as operating interdependently helps explain why the attempt to 
manage globalization actually stimulates and nourishes it.    
 
Alberta Sbragia, a political scientist, is the Jean Monnet Chair ad personam 
and the Mark A. Nordenberg University Chair at the University of 
Pittsburgh USA where she directs the European Union Center of Excellence 
and the European Studies Center 
 
Address for Correspondence: 
 
Department of Political Science 
Posvar Hall 
University of Pittsburgh 
Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA 
sbragia@pitt.edu 
 
 
The author would like to thank Maurizio Carbone, Chad Damro, Martin 
Holland, Martin Rhodes,  Martin Staniland, Pascaline Winand, and Alasdair 
Young as well as the participants in the Park City, Utah workshop who gave 
me valuable feedback and suggestions. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 For the sake of convenience, the term European Union (EU) will be used throughout the 
text. 
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